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THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER
Kingsly Alec McConnell*
Abstract: Can the federal government unilaterally change your gender? In October of 2018,
the New York Times revealed that the Trump Administration’s Department of Health and
Human Services was considering a new federal definition of “gender.” The policy would
redefine gender as a “biological, immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth.” This
policy places transsex people at a substantial risk of deprivation of property and speech rights,
as gender implicates both property and expression. It also impedes the exercise of substantive
due process rights and privileges and immunities. For example, inaccurate gender designations
can hinder a transsex parent’s ability to raise children, and accurate gender markers protect the
right to a common calling by shielding transsex people from employment discrimination and
procedural barriers.
This Comment argues that gender designations represent both a property right and a
protected expression of speech. Government-issued gender designations, or gender markers,
have taken on a special legal identity that is distinct from assigned or lived gender, and these
markers frequently translate into discrete rights for transsex individuals. The Trump
Administration’s policy not only upends traditional understandings of gender under state and
federal law, but also attempts to dissuade transsex people from engaging in public life, and
ultimately, existing in the world. Because transsex people have a liberty interest in maintaining
an accurate gender designation, the Trump Administration’s redefinition is unconstitutional.

*

J.D. and LL.M. Candidate in Sustainable International Development, University of Washington
School of Law, Class of 2020. This Comment would not be possible without guidance and creative
insight from Professor Peter Nicolas. Additional thanks to the Washington Law Review team for their
time and efforts in editing this piece.
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“[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.” . . . It is precisely because the issue
raised . . . touches the heart of what makes individuals what they
are that we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those
whose choices upset the majority.”1
INTRODUCTION
In October 2018, a leaked memorandum indicated that the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) sought to redefine the legal
meaning of gender.2 Instead of determining gender based on modern
conceptions of biology and neuroscience3 or even deferring to state law
on the question,4 the new conception would define gender as a “biological,
immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth.”5 Under the policy,
a gender designation listed on a birth certificate would be presumptive
evidence of an individual’s gender, but the designation could ultimately
be rebutted by genetic evidence.6 While some individuals will justifiably
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could be Defined Out of Existence
Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us
/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/ZA5C-X9VX].
3. See, e.g., Sari M. van Anders et al., Biological Sex, Gender, and Public Policy, 4
POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 194, 194, 199 (2017) (“For gender/sex policy, science
shows no one aspect of sex (hormones, genes, genitals, gonads) trumps others—gender identity
matters most.”).
4. Delineation of gender has traditionally been left to the states. See infra Part I. Until this policy,
the federal government has respected and deferred to state law definitions of gender; for example, all
federal identification documents defer to state birth certificates for demarcations of gender, regardless
of whether the state recognizes, or does not recognize, the genders of transsex people. See infra note
11. A federalism issue arises when the federal government steps into an area “within the authority
and realm of the separate States.” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 764 (2013). When the
United States Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 2013, the Court
found that the definition and regulation of domestic relationships belonged to the state’s regulatory
sphere. Id. at 766. Like DOMA, the Trump Administration’s policy challenges a long-established
state regulatory scheme. See infra Part I. When a state grants a corrected gender marker, it “confer[s]
upon [a transsex individual] a dignity and status of immense import.” Cf. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768.
In contrast, the federal government’s newest policy “uses th[e] state-defined class for the opposite
purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities,” thus seeking to injure a class—transsex people—
many states specifically sought to protect. Cf. id. at 768.
5. Green et al., supra note 2.
6. Id. It is unclear how the proposed redefinition of gender would apply to individuals whose natal
phenotype and genotype do not align; for example, a cissex woman who is born with a vulva but has
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be concerned with the federal government prying into their genetic
information and particularized reproductive and sexual health, in the legal
world, it is well settled that sex—regardless of its correlation to lived
gender—is ultimately defined by government.7
Having a gender designation that accurately reflects one’s lived
experience is frequently taken for granted by many cissex8 people. Yet the
legal paradigm is extraordinarily evident for those who live in the
uncomfortable middle of an exclusionary, binary legal designation. Such
binary conceptions of gender favor cissex people, particularly in
effectuation of rights and liberties.9
Designating genders in ambiguous or contested scenarios was a task
historically left to courts.10 More recently, state legislatures have begun

XY sex-determination chromosomes. See, e.g., Miroslav Dumic et al., Report of Fertility in a Woman
with a Predominantly 46,XY Karyotype in a Family with Multiple Disorders of Sexual Development,
93 J. CLINICAL ENDROCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 182 (2008) (discussing the unassisted pregnancy
of a cissex woman with a Y chromosome); FAQ, Does Having a Y Chromosome Make Someone a
Man?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/y_chromosome [https://perma.cc/LRR46L3H] (“[I]t is simply incorrect to think that you can tell a person’s sex just looking at whether he or
she has a Y chromosome.”). If an individual’s assigned gender is recorded incorrectly on their birth
certificate, they would have to rebut their gender through karyotype testing. For those like the cissex
woman with a Y chromosome, she would be unable to rebut the gender designation on her
birth certificate.
7. See generally infra Part I.
8. A cissexual or cissex person is an individual whose assigned gender matches their gender
identity. See Cissexual/Cisgender: Decentralizing the Dominant Group, EMINISM.ORG (June 07,
2002), http://www.eminism.org/interchange/2002/20020607-wmstl.html [https://perma.cc/AXW8CFW5] (noting that “[b]y using the term ‘cissexual’ and ‘cisgender,’ [trans activists] de-centralize the
dominant group, exposing it as merely one possible alternative rather than the ‘norm’ against which
trans people are defined”).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra section I.A.
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addressing the needs of transsex11 and intersex12 individuals for
guaranteed changes to gender markers.13 Absent policies and laws that
expressly permit alterations to gender markers, transsex people are often
not entitled to the benefits of legal gender. And, perhaps more crucially,
they are displaced from the exercise of constitutional rights implicit
in gender.14
Since an explosive New York Times article revealed the proposed
policy to the public,15 HHS has shifted its strategy. HHS enforces Title IX
of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in educational programs and activities
11. For the purposes of this Comment, I will be utilizing “transsex” to refer to individuals who have
medically transitioned from one sex to another, without defining a specific form of medical transition.
This Comment utilizes this narrow category of transgender people because current federal guidelines
require that individuals generally undergo some form of medical transition to alter their gender
designation. See, e.g., Program Operations Manual System (POMS), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110212200 [https://perma.cc/FLM6-QVXV] (social security
requirements); Change of Sex Marker, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, U.S. DEP’T ST.—BUREAU CONSULAR
AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/change-of-sexmarker.html [https://perma.cc/H2LJ-QPB5] (passport requirements); Chapter 10.22 Change of
Gender Designation on Documents Issued by USCIS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-1067/Chapter10-22.html
[https://perma.cc/7HSK-XD2V] (citizenship and immigration document requirements). But see
Admin. Law–Identity Records–Soc. Sec. Admin. Eliminates Surgical Requirement for Changing Trans
Individuals’ Gender Markers–Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System, Rm 10212.200
Changing Numident Data for Reasons Other Than Name Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1863 (2014)
(noting that individuals may now submit amended birth certificates, a court order indicating the
change of gender, or a physician’s verification of the new gender, which depending on the applicant’s
location may not require any particular medical procedure). To encourage scholars to prioritize
humanizing language for the LGBTQ community, I opt to use “transsex person” over “transsexual,”
while acknowledging that many will not personally identify with this language.
12. An intersex person is “born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the
typical definitions of female or male.” What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex [https://perma.cc/2ZMC-UHFA]. Because some intersex
people will require alteration of their assigned gender marker to more accurately reflect their lived
gender, this Comment uses transsex in an expansive form to include intersex people.
13. To date, all states except for Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee permit transsex people to alter their
gender markers. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2422c (1990), as interpreted by In re Estate of Gardiner, 22
P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the statute permitting minor corrections to birth
certificates did not include corrections to gender based on transsex status); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3705.15 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (West 2019) (“The sex of an individual shall not
be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); see also In re
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (determining that the legislature did not intend
gender marker alteration on the basis of transsex status by enacting its birth record statute). For a
complete list of statutes, regulations, and court decisions on state gender alterations, see Changing
Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA
LEGAL,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-changing-birth-certificate-sexdesignations [https://perma.cc/AE5L-QMPB].
14. See generally infra Parts IV, V.
15. See Green et al., supra note 2.
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funded by the federal government.16 On June 14, 2019, HHS published a
proposed rule to eliminate the definition of “on the basis of sex,”17 which
previously recognized and protected transsex individuals from
discrimination in an educational setting.18 Due to impending Supreme
Court litigation,19 the HHS has declined to finalize a new definition at this
time.20 This has essentially stalled any movement of the gender policy
highlighted by the HHS memorandum. However, the fundamental
inquiry—that is, whether federal agencies can unilaterally change a
person’s gender designation—remains relevant and of deep concern to
transsex people living under the Trump Administration.
This Comment argues that legal gender is an independent concept,
separate from lived or experienced gender, that is translated into
constitutional rights—specifically, property and speech rights—through
gender markers and designations.21 Even in an increasingly egalitarian
society, gender remains relevant to the spaces and accommodations
people occupy.22 Legal gender also impacts the exercise of substantive

16. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg.
27,846, 27,853 (June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, & 156).
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 27,856 (noting that HHS, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and Department
of Education, previously took the position that “on the basis of sex” included gender identity).
19. See infra note 207; see also Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, __U.S.__, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
20. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. at 27,857.
21. Gender markers or gender designations are the delineation of gender on birth certificates and
identification documents; traditionally “M” for male or “F” for female. The current trend across the
United States and other developed nations is to also permit an “X” gender designation. See Amy
Harmon, Which Box Do You Check? Some States are Offering a Nonbinary Option, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/nonbinary-drivers-licenses.html
[https://perma.cc/U9DD-DH6D]. This marker is popular with non-binary people and it is an alluring
option for individuals who reject government involvement with gender entirely. This Comment does
not attempt to attack the constitutionality of binary legal designations, but rather argues that the
misclassification of binary transsex people under the current regime is unconstitutional. For more on
non-binary gender markers and the law, see generally Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132
HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019).
22. See Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (bathroom and locker room access
in public universities); Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991) (sex-segregated prisons);
Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296–321 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (bathroom
access in public schools); Keohane v. Jones, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (sex-segregated
prisons and access to medical treatment); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys.
of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (bathroom and locker room access in public
universities); Erin E. Buzuvis, Transgender Student-Athletes and Sex-Segregated Sport: Developing
Policies of Inclusion for Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 1, 5–7 (2011) (sex-segregated sports); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
731, 775 (2007).
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due process rights and privileges and immunities.23 The Trump
Administration’s proposal would rescind accurate gender markers for
transsex people, thus harming the property and speech interests inherent
to legal gender. This Comment concludes by finding that transsex
individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in an accurate
gender designation.
Gender and property are already deeply intertwined.24 This Comment
expounds upon theoretical concepts laid forth in Cheryl I. Harris’s
Whiteness as Property, a renowned thesis on the interconnection of race
and property in United States legal and social history, but with
consideration of legal designations of gender.25 It also draws upon Charles
A. Reich’s The New Property, which conceived an inherent connection
between property, liberty, and life.26 Other legal scholars have already
connected heteronormativity27 and cisnormativity28 with property rights,29
and sex and gender to property and intellectual property,30 respectively.
This Comment adds to the present literature by analyzing the newly
leaked federal policy, which would inhibit alteration of federal gender
designations and revert accurate gender designations for transsex
people.31 Through the lens of property law, free speech jurisprudence, and
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See, e.g., Lauren Wigginton, Heteronormative Identities as Property: Adversely Possessing
Maleness and Femaleness, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 142 (2014) (explaining that
early common law allocated property rights based on gender).
25. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
Although Plessy v. Ferguson rejected the argument that whiteness was actually a property right, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the outer demarcations of race “is one upon which there is a
difference of opinion in the different states.” 163 U.S. 537, 549, 552 (1896), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court refused to define black
or white, leaving those “questions to be determined under the laws of each state.” Id. at 552. This
contrasts the federal government’s proposed policy, which would supersede traditional state
definitions of gender. See supra note 4.
26. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich,
The New Property].
27. Heteronormativity is defined as “of, relating to, or based on the attitude that heterosexuality is
the only normal and natural expression of sexuality.” Heteronormative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/heteronormative [https://perma.cc/3FLD-S2M3].
28. Cisnormativity, or cissexual assumption, refers to concepts that erase transex lives and
experiences, wherein cissex people are presumed to be normal and transsex people abnormal. See
JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF
FEMININITY 164–70 (2007).
29. See generally Wigginton, supra note 24.
30. See generally Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389 (2017).
31. Green et al., supra note 2; Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out
of Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2
018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/ZA5C-
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gender theory, this Comment contextualizes present literature with a real
and impending threat to transsex people’s wellbeing. It ultimately
concludes that the Trump Administration’s proposed policy
is unconstitutional.32
First, this Comment argues that gender designations are a type of
property or government-created form of wealth that are essential to life,
liberty, and economic security.33 Analyzing various theories of property
rights, this Comment draws connections between the characteristics of
property and gender designations. For transsex individuals, the
constitutional implications of gender as property are profound. Inaccurate
gender designations frequently implicate transsex people’s substantive
due process rights and privileges and immunities. For example, accurate
gender designations grant many transsex people the assumption of
cisness,34 isolating them from transphobic attacks and discrimination.

X9VX].
32. The Trump Administration’s proposal raises a plethora of constitutional issues that are outside
the scope of this Comment. The federal government’s involvement in the collection and assessment
of genetic material to decipher a “legal” gender implicates privacy law, technology law, and
unreasonable searches and seizures. The proposal may also raise an equal protection inquiry, if the
Trump Administration distinguishes between transsex and cissex individuals in the implementation
of its new policy. It would not be surprising if the policy facially discriminated against transsex
people, as the Trump Administration has relentlessly targeted transsex individuals for discrimination
and erasure of legal protections. For an ongoing list of such discriminatory policies, see The
Discrimination Administration: Trump’s Record of Action Against Transgender People, NAT’L CTR.
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/the-discrimination-administration
[https://perma.cc/GY4S-YA36]. If property rights are attributed to gender, unilaterally changing an
individual’s gender marker may constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. On a state level, failure to
recognize an individual’s gender designation across states lines may be a violation of the full faith
and credit clause. This is an ongoing question across state borders. See, e.g., In re Marriage License
for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31,
2003) (holding that an individual’s birth certificate in another state may be rebutted by evidence of
transsex status; also, finding that the legislative policy of Ohio was to not recognize a marriage
between a transsex man and a cissex woman). Failure to recognize a transsex person’s marriage is
now unconstitutional with the holding of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015);
however, the birth certificate recognition issue remains undecided. For more on the constitutional
implications, see generally Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It with You:
Constitutional Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819 (2005).
The federal government’s redefinition also raises a federalism concern, as all but three states
purposively permit alterations of gender markers for transsex people. See supra note 4; infra note 71.
While these constitutional issues are live, I leave these concerns for another day. Instead, this
Comment focuses on two areas of rights that are almost certainly implicated by the government’s
policy. Because the policy stems from a leaked memorandum, it is unclear what the specific
implementation methods would require or if it will ever come to fruition. Absent more information,
this Comment targets two areas of constitutional law that stem directly from depriving transsex
individuals of an accurate gender designation in nearly all circumstances: property and speech rights.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra section IV.A.
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Further, having matching identification documents helps protect
individuals from discrimination.35
Second, the Trump Administration’s proposed redefinition constitutes
“compelled speech,” in violation of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.36 It is well-settled that the First Amendment protects
both “the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”37
Under the compelled speech doctrine, the federal government may not
intrude on an individual’s right to “decide for himself or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”38 The
expression of assigned-gender on a birth certificate is an inaccurate and
forced statement of self and identity.39 Gender is thus an expression of
speech.40 In addition, when an individual’s federal gender designation
differentiates from their state gender designation or physical appearance,
they are forced to disclose their transsex status to explain the
discrepancy.41 In some cases, even a birth certificate indicating that it was
“amended” may constitute compelled speech and can interfere with First
Amendment rights.42
These impacts challenge the mere existence of transsex people in legal
and social society. Inaccurate gender designations affect all areas of a
transsex person’s life, ranging from employment and parental rights to the
mere use of public facilities. Indeed, gender markers have special value
compared to other forms of government-created privileges, as gender
designations can impact substantive due process rights and privileges and
immunities.43 Due to the liberty impact of gender, this Comment finds that
transsex people have a constitutional interest in maintaining an accurate
gender designation, and the Trump Administration’s proposed rule
is unlawful.
This Comment proceeds in five Parts. Part I illustrates how courts
historically dealt with gender designations on a case-by-case basis. State
35. See infra section IV.B.
36. For an overview of the compelled speech doctrine and its impact on gender designations and
other identifiers—primarily gender pronouns, see generally Tyler Sherman, Note, All Employers Must
Wash Their Speech Before Returning to Work: The First Amendment & Compelled Use of Employees’
Preferred Gender Pronouns, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 219 (2017).
37. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
38. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
39. See infra section V.B.
40. See infra section V.B.
41. F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1135 (D. Idaho 2018).
42. See id. (noting that both parties agreed that including revision history on a state birth certificate
constitutes compelled speech, so the court would not address the merits of the claim).
43. See infra Part IV.
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courts (and legislatures) created independent legal regimes for gender
marker alteration, and these regimes impacted transsex people’s right to
marry and bring up children. Part II overviews theories of property. It
considers traditional characteristics of property rights, as well as newer
conceptions of wealth known as “the new property.44 Part III analyzes the
compelled speech doctrine under First Amendment law, considering the
breadth of activities that constitute “speech.” Part IV illustrates how
gender markers impact substantive due process rights and privileges and
immunities of transsex people, arguing that transsex people have a vested
interest in retaining an accurate gender marker. Part V then combines
theories of property and free speech law to delineate how gender
designations implicate constitutional interests, contending that rescinding
or prohibiting accurate gender designations is unconstitutional. It
concludes by arguing that the Trump Administration’s proposed
redefinition of gender is unconstitutional.
I.

GENDER AND THE JUDICIARY

Transsex individuals have frequently appeared before courts of law to
argue for recognition of their gender.45 In fact, family law jurisprudence
has often turned the gender of transsex individuals into a core legal
inquiry.46 In these cases, courts are confronted with the question: “[w]hen
is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?”47 This Part will lay the
historical foundation for state regulation of this question. In essence,
courts “assumed the crucial task of [gender] classification, and accepted
and embraced the then-current theories of [gender],” often as biological
fact.48 Through jurisprudence—and subsequent legislation—states have
managed to develop their own respective regimes for amendments to
gender markers. This means state courts frequently authorized corrections
for transsex individuals, but on some occasions, they have hesitated to
create public policy on gender marker alterations absent legislative or
administrative help.49 States have strengthened these regimes by expressly
44. See generally Reich, The New Property, supra note 26.
45. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1988) (rejecting a transsex person’s
petition to alter the gender designation on their birth certificate); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987) (same); K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977) (same).
46. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 86 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Maryland courts have
jurisdiction to rule upon petitions for gender marker alterations, and remanding to the trial court for a
factual showing of transsex petitioner’s gender).
47. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
48. Cf. Harris, supra note 25, at 1737.
49. See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832 (holding that “the legislature should change the
statutes, if it is to be the public policy” of Ohio to permit transsex people to change their gender
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permitting transsex individuals to alter gender designations. For example,
today, all but three states permit alterations to individual birth
certificates.50 However, judicial history remains relevant to understanding
how gender has been historically rooted in state regulatory power, and
how this exercise of power has ultimately impacted the fundamental rights
of transsex people.
The earliest published case of gender marker alteration concerning a
transsex person is Anonymous v. Weiner.51 In 1966, the Supreme Court of
New York rejected a transsex woman’s petition to alter her name and
gender designation on her birth certificate.52 Relying on statements from
the Committee on Public Health of the New York Academy of Medicine,
the court refused “to substitute its views for those of the administrative
body.”53 It granted deference to the Committee, which was staunchly
opposed to alterations of gender on birth certificates for transsex people
on the basis that a transsex person’s interest to have an accurate reflection
of gender on their birth certificate was “outweighed by the public interest
for protection against fraud.”54
However, not even two years later, the Civil Court of the City of New
York blatantly rejected this rationale by permitting a transsex woman to
change her name on her birth certificate.55 While a gender marker change
was not at the forefront of the plaintiff’s legal claim, the court explicitly
rejected the scientific and legal rationale proffered by the Weiner Court:
This court is in complete disagreement with the conclusion
reached by the [Committee on Public Health of the New York
Academy of Medicine]. A [female] transsexual who submits to a
sex-reassignment is anatomically and psychologically a female in
fact. . . . It has further been stated that “male to female
transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly
females.” Nevertheless, should the question of a person’s identity
be limited by the results of mere histological section or
biochemical analysis, with a complete disregard for the human
brain, the organ responsible for most functions and reactions,

markers); K., 560 P.2d at 1072 n.5 (holding that whether altered gender markers should be issued to
transsex people “is a matter of public policy to be decided by the Oregon legislature”).
50. See infra note 71.
51. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966).
52. Id. at 320, 324.
53. Id. at 323.
54. Id. at 322–23.
55. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
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many so exquisite in nature, including sex orientation? I
think not.56
This perception of sex, which includes a gradation of factors ranging from
genotypical sex57 to gender identity, is in line with modern jurisprudence
on gender. Although there is no judicial consensus on the meaning of
“sex,” courts in the twenty-first century have been more receptive to
definitions of sex that encompass ambiguity. For instance, courts have
identified up to seven factors that may be relevant in sex determination:
(1) internal morphologic sex; (2) external morphologic sex; (3) gonadal
sex; (4) genotypic sex; (5) hormonal sex; (6) phenotypic sex; and
(7) sexual (or gender) identity.58
The role of gender designations became increasingly more complicated
where marriage was involved. In 1971, Anonymous v. Anonymous59
concerned a noncommissioned officer in the United States Army who
sought a declaration of his marital status by the Supreme Court of New
York. He alleged that he married his wife prior to having intimate relations
with her—after which, he discovered she was transsex.60 By the time of
the proceedings, his wife had undergone gender confirmation surgery,61
but he asked the court to declare the marriage invalid.62 In finding that no
marriage contract ever existed, the court determined that “[t]he law makes
no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex.”63 The
court recognized that the defendant’s “sex ha[d] been changed to female
by operative procedures,” but nevertheless held that “[w]hat happened to
the defendant after the marriage ceremony is irrelevant, since the parties
never lived together.”64
In this statement, the Anonymous Court provided an interesting caveat.
The court held that the woman was legally “male” prior to her gender
confirmation surgery (and thus her marriage).65 However, the court’s
56. Id. at 838.
57. Genotype refers to the genetic constitution of an individual, typically in reference to a particular
trait or set of traits. Genotype, MERRIAM-WEBSTER MED. DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/genotype#medicalDictionary [https://perma.cc/MH5L-FP4Y]. In this
discussion, genotypic sex refers to sex as narrowly defined by the XY sex-determination system.
58. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 73 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “[t]here is a recognized
medical viewpoint that gender is not determined by any single criterion,” but that up to “seven factors
may be relevant”).
59. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971).
60. Id. at 500.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 499.
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rationale indicates that a transsex woman who has medically transitioned
prior to marriage (and who subsequently lives with her husband as a
married couple) is “female” for marital purposes.66
This caveat was not actually exceptional in jurisprudence; it was
similarly espoused by the Superior Court of New Jersey in M.T. v. J.T.67
In M.T. v. J.T., the court determined that a transsex woman who
underwent gender confirmation surgery became “a member of the female
sex for marital purposes,” and that her marriage to a man was legitimate.68
Because her husband had lived with her, he was legally “obligated to
support her as his wife,”69 regardless of her transsex status. A notable part
of the court’s analysis was the fact that both parties had lived together as
husband and wife.70
To contrast, many states have had forceful histories denying
recognition of transsex people’s genders.71 For example, in In re
Declaratory Relief for Ladrach,72 a transsex woman’s marriage was under
scrutiny because her birth certificate listed her as male.73 The Probate
Court of Stark County, Ohio came to the same conclusion as the court in
Anonymous v. Anonymous; however, it based its holding on public policy
and its role as a judicial, rather than legislative, entity.74 The Ladrach
Court stated: “only three states, Arizona, Louisiana and Illinois, have
statutes that allow the birth record of a transsexual to be changed
following sex reassignment surgery. . . . However, another twelve states
have permitted a post-operative change of sex designation on birth
records.”75 It then concluded by deferring to the legislature: “it is this
court’s opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is to be

66. Id. at 500.
67. 140 N.J. Super. 77 (1976).
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 79, 87–88.
71. As of 2020, three states (Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee) continue to refuse alterations of gender
markers on birth certificates for transsex people. See supra note 13; F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d
1131, 1136 n.4 (D. Idaho 2018). Tennessee is the only state that explicitly forbids the alteration of
gender for transsex or intersex people through gender confirmation surgery. TENN. CODE ANN. § 683-203(d) (West 2019) (“The sex of an individual shall not be changed on the original certificate of
birth as a result of sex change surgery.”); Spade, supra note 22, at 735. Some states have found that
denying the alteration of a gender marker based on the individual’s transsex status is a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d
at 1135.
72. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
73. Id. at 829.
74. See id. at 832.
75. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
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the public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to postoperative transsexuals.”76
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Oregon also addressed the birth
certificate inquiry and found that it was likely “the intent of the legislature
of Oregon that a ‘birth certificate’ [be] an historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.”77 Therefore, legislative authorization
was necessary for the amendment of gender on a birth certificate.78 In
doing so, the court denied a post-operative transsex man’s79 request to be
listed as male and reversed the lower court’s determination that his birth
certificate represent “a record of facts as they presently exist.”80
Intriguingly, the court mentioned that Oregon law permitted issuance of a
new birth certificate when the name of a child’s parent is changed,81 but
failed to address the fact that such an alteration would necessarily entail
that a birth certificate did not reflect the “facts as they existed at the time
of birth.”82
In Littleton v. Prange,83 the Court of Appeals of Texas grappled with
the delineation of gender for a transsex woman.84 The court analyzed case
precedent from various jurisdictions85 and held that a transsex woman
who had fully transitioned was nonetheless “male” under Texas law.86
Because Texas prohibited same-sex marriages, the court declared her
marriage to a man invalid.87 A decade later, the Texas legislature
overruled Littleton through passage of section 2.005 of the Texas Family
Code, which provided that individuals may change their name and sex
designation through court order for means of obtaining a
marriage license.88
The federal government’s current policy, which allows transsex people
to amend gender markers on documents, replicates most state regimes.89
76. Id. at 832.
77. K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977).
78. See id. at 1071–72.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1071.
82. Id. at 1072.
83. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
84. Id. at 223–24.
85. Id. at 226–29.
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id. at 231.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.005(b)(8) (West 2019). Texas also now permits direct alterations to
birth certificates through court order. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.011 (West 2019).
89. See supra notes 11, 13.
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State jurisprudence on gender alteration helps demonstrate the extreme
consequences of the Trump Administration’s proposed policy, as the
policy would usurp the state’s historic authority to define gender. Overall,
state courts have a long history of grappling with the gender designations
of transsex people. Without guidance in the twentieth century, courts have
had to weigh the rights of transsex individuals, the testimony of medical
experts, and the court’s role as a neutral arbitrator rather than a policy
maker. In many of these cases, gender has been better addressed by state
legislatures stepping in and delineating how gender markers may be
altered in the first place.90
II.

THEORIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property is nothing but the basis of expectation[] . . . consist[ing]
in an established expectation, in the persuasion of being able to
draw such and such advantage from the thing possessed. . . . This
theory does not suggest that all value or all expectations give rise
to property, but those expectations in tangible or intangible things
which are valued and protected by the law are property.91

There is no universally accepted definition of property. Therefore, this
Part will overview some of the various conceptions of property and
highlight the main attributes among those differing theories. It begins by
overviewing traditional theories of property. Then it will extrapolate on
“new property” rights, which are government-created forms of wealth or
privilege that sit outside the traditional conception of property.92 As
Charles Reich notes, these privileges are important to the exercise of
liberty93 and should be explicitly recognized as rights.94 Gender provides
access to bathrooms and locker rooms in public schools95 and
90. See supra note 13.
91. Harris, supra note 25, at 1729 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 785–87.
93. See generally Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 295 (1990) [hereinafter Reich, The Liberty Impact].
94. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 785–86.
95. See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296–1321 (M.D. Fla. 2018);
see also Spade, supra note 22, at 775.
95. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender
Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of
Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 379, 391–99 (2013) (“Policies that provide
transgender people with identity documents that match their gender identity give them a better chance
to live life in their gender, and avoid bias, discrimination, and violence in the areas most critical to
quality of life, such as employment, housing, and education.”).
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universities,96 participation in sex-segregated sports,97 ultimate placement
in sex-segregated prisons,98 subsequent access to healthcare in prison,99
and even fundamental rights.100 Both overarching theories support the
premise that gender is property.101
A.

Traditional Property

Broadly speaking, property is simply an entitlement “protected by
formal legal institutions.”102 There are many factors that differentiate
property from other forms of rights or claims, but the most defining is the
right to exclude.103 For example, English jurist William Blackstone
defined property as the “sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”104 This
profound description makes the right to exclude others a sufficient and
conditional aspect of property. The idea that the right to exclude is of
fundamental importance to property is known as the single-variable
essentialist interpretation.105
However, property may be more encompassing than the mere right to
exclude. A separate school of thought, known as multiple-variable
essentialism,106 perceives property as a “bundle of sticks,” with the right
to exclude constituting merely one “stick” in a collection of rights
and privileges.107
Yet another conception of property is nominalism, which “views
property as a purely conventional concept with no fixed meaning.”108
96. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp.
3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
97. Buzuvis, supra note 22, at 5–7.
98. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991) (sex-segregated prisons).
99. See Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App’x 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); Keohane v. Jones, 328
F. Supp. 3d 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (sex-segregated prisons and access to medical treatment);.
100. See generally infra Part IV.
101. See infra section V.A.
102. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 3 (2010) (ebook).
103. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176–80 (1979) (“[W]e hold that the ‘right to
exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.”).
104. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766)
(emphasis added).
105. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1998).
106. Id. at 734.
107. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 102, at 5.
108. Merrill, supra note 105, at 737.
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Under nominalism, property is not dependent or reliant on the right to
exclude, and the government can label just about anything as property.109
Like multiple-variable essentialism, nominalism comprises a “bundle of
sticks,” but it has no explicit, identifiable constituents.110 The United
States Supreme Court has described property’s “bundle of sticks” just as
vaguely: it is “a collection of individual rights which, in certain
combinations, constitute property.”111
Consequently, there is no firm consensus on the definition of property,
or even how central the right to exclude is in evaluating property
interests.112 “A legal system can label property as anything it wants to,”
dependent on the social values and beliefs of its society.113 Yet, even
absent a universally accepted definition, scholars agree that property must
have certain characteristics.114 For purposes of this Comment, I consider
the right to exclude as a persuasive element of property, in conjunction
with the right to possess, the right to use, and the right to transfer.115
B.

The New Property

In contrast to traditional theories of property, “new property” concerns
government-created forms of wealth that society finds valuable. Charles
Reich’s 1964 law review article The New Property first highlighted the
distinction between traditional property and “new property.”116 Reich
differentiated between traditional wealth, which is created by culture and
society, and property, which is created by law.117 Occupational licenses,
driver’s licenses, franchises, benefits, subsidies, use of public resources,
and contracts are all examples of government-created wealth—or what he
coined “the new property.”118 Today, according to Reich, the new
property is “the rule rather than the exception.”119
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002).
112. Merrill, supra note 105, at 734. But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80
(1979) (finding that the right to exclude is a fundamental element of property).
113. Merrill, supra note 105, at 737.
114. Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the
Question, “Is This Property?,” 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1125, 1128–29 (2013).
115. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he most
important sticks in the bundle are: (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to transfer; and (3) the right
to possess and use.”).
116. See generally Reich, The New Property, supra note 26.
117. Id. at 733.
118. Id. at 734–37.
119. Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 93, at 296. Although states have frequently used the
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Reich also notes that courts are more likely to protect privileges that
“are intimately bound up with the individual’s freedom to earn a
living.”120 Several Supreme Court justices have opined that some
government-created privileges may have more value than other forms of
traditional property, as they implicate these liberty interests.121 Justice
Black opined that, for a physician, the right to practice medicine is “a very
precious part of . . . liberty . . . . It may mean more than any property,”122
as it pertains to the pursuit of a common calling. Similarly, Justice
Douglas highlighted government payrolls, defense and highway contracts,
subsidies to air carriers and railroads, disbursements for scientific
research, and television and radio licenses as examples of “new property,”
which “directly or indirectly implicate the home life of the recipients.”123
Under Reich’s theory, “the law continues to treat forms of wealth that
have become essentials as mere privileges,”124 even though more and
more of an individual’s wealth “takes the form of rights or status rather
than of tangible goods” or property.125 For example, it is commonly
understood that there is no right to operate a motor vehicle; rather, it is a
privilege subject to state regulation.126 But individuals who use motor
vehicles to earn a livelihood have a particular property interest in retaining
their driver’s licenses.127
Another illustration is the right to marry. Marriage is a governmentcreated privilege128 and also a fundamental right under both equal

new property privileges that Reich discusses to advance civil rights causes, see, for example,
Licensing Agencies: Race in Application Forms—California, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 658 (1960), the
proposed federal memorandum is fundamentally opposed to such a concept—instead, the policy
maliciously brandishes gender markers as a limiting principle on transsex people’s lives.
120. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 741.
121. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326–27 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Barsky v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ., 347 U.S. 442, 459 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Reich, The Liberty
Impact, supra note 93, at 305–06.
122. Barsky, 347 U.S. at 459.
123. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326–27.
124. Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 93, at 298 (emphasis added).
125. Reich, The New Property, supra note 26, at 738.
126. Id. at 740.
127. See id. at 740–42.
128. The Constitution is traditionally understood to protect “negative rights”—that is, rights that
restrain the actions of government “to protect individual autonomy and personhood.” Rachel A.
Washburn, Freedom of Marriage: An Analysis of Positive and Negative Rights, 8 WASH. U. JURIS.
REV. 87, 95, 104 (2015). However, Obergefell v. Hodges arguably acknowledged a fundamental right
that “ensures active protection by the federal government,” indicating that marriage has the
characteristics of both a positive and negative right. Id. at 104–05. A positive right is one where there
is “dependence on the judicial state” to exercise it. Id. at 105.
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protection and due process jurisprudence.129 Once individuals are married,
they have a negative right to retain their marriage, as it is interpreted as a
property interest.130 In theory, if a state were to stop issuing marriage
licenses, it would likely violate the equal protection clause unless it also
rescinds all previously issued marriage licenses.131 However, it is highly
unlikely that marriage licenses could be rescinded if the government
stopped affirmatively offering marriage, as courts have “unanimously
treated the changes in law as prospective only, typically concluding that
pre-existing marriages [are] a sort of vested property right.”132 In short,
“there is a separate substantive due process right to retain the status and
attendant property interests once lawfully attained.”133 A similar analogy
can be drawn to gender markers: once an amended marker is granted,
transsex individuals have an interest to retain the marker and its attendant
property interests.
Synthesizing competing theories, property is, essentially, what the law
will draw boundaries for, which enforce (or reorder) the existing regime
of power.134 When it comes to gender, individuals have a property interest
in maintaining an accurate gender marker, as gender exhibits qualities of
traditional property. At a minimum, gender designations are examples of
government-created licenses that society imbues with meaning and value.
Under both scenarios, gender is property, and a transsex individual has a

129. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (“[T]he Court has long held
the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (“[O]ur past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))); id. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also
Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375,
1386–91 (2010).
130. Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
331, 359 (2016).
131. Id. at 360.
132. Id. (emphasis added). Note, however, that marriage is a substantive due process right under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. This example is
therefore distinctive in that marriage has been declared “fundamental,” while a gender designation,
or a right to a correct gender designation, has not. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he
decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail and Loving v. Virginia.”) (citations
omitted). However, if the “negative rights associated with marriage evaporated,” state governments
could technically remove themselves from issuing marriage licenses altogether. Nicolas, supra note
130, at 358–59. Nicolas argues it likely evaporated under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 355. In that situation, the same property and due process inquiry would likely arise.
133. Id. at 360.
134. Harris, supra note 25, at 1730.
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constitutional interest in maintaining the property rights attendant to
their gender.
III. COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
Gender is also a form of speech protected by the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution.135 The First Amendment states that federal
and state governments “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”136 The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
protect both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking.137
The compelled speech doctrine states that the government may not require
expression or utterance of a specific message, nor may it stifle speech on
account of its message.138 Thus, the First Amendment protects individuals
from forced expression of an ideology that they find
personally unacceptable.139
At its heart, the First Amendment provides “that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.”140 Crucially, the prohibition against
compelled speech encompasses all speech, not just ideological and
political speech.141 Because the principle underlying the compelled speech
doctrine is to protect “freedom of mind,”142 the compelled speech doctrine

135. See, e.g., Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing
that a trans “high school student’s decision to wear traditionally female clothes to school as an
expression of female gender identity [is] protected speech”); Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
No. Civ.02–1531PHX–SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *9 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (finding that a transsex
woman’s expression of gender is a kind of speech directed to the public); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,
No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom Doe v.
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000);
Grzywna ex rel. Doe v. Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)
(holding that patriotic accessorization of outfits constituted “speech”); A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v.
Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882–83 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a Native
American male student’s braids were communicative enough to constitute “speech”); see also
Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern
Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 131 (2015) (arguing that use of gendered
restrooms is speech itself).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
137. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
138. See id. at 717.
139. Id. at 715.
140. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641 (1994)).
141. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2014).
142. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329,
332 (2008).

17 McConnell.docx (Do Not Delete)

478

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/28/20 7:22 PM

[Vol. 95:459

has been interpreted liberally.143 The Supreme Court has held three
general categories of compelled speech to be unconstitutional:
(1) government action that forces a private speaker to propagate a
particular message chosen by the government;144 (2) government action
that forces a private speaker to accommodate or include another private
speaker’s message;145 and (3) government action that forces an individual
to subsidize or contribute to an organization that engages in speech the
individual opposes.146
The compelled speech doctrine was first developed in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,147 which represents the first
prohibited category of compelled speech.148 Barnette concerned a West
Virginia resolution that required school children to recite the pledge of
allegiance and perform a stiff-arm salute to the flag of the United States.149
Refusal to salute meant expulsion from school, and even criminal
prosecution of parents due to child delinquency.150 In striking down the
resolution, the Court found that flag salutes and symbolic gestures were a
“form of utterance” and a “way of communicating ideas.”151
After Barnette, the Supreme Court continued to expand the compelled
speech doctrine. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,152 the Court
established the second category of compelled speech. Tornillo concerned
Florida’s “right-to-reply” statute, which required newspapers to provide a
platform for response—free of cost—to political candidates if the
newspaper had attacked their “personal character.”153 The Court held that
Florida engaged in content discrimination by coercing newspapers into

143. See id.
144. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
145. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581
(1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1986); Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
146. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.
431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled in part by Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Emps.,
Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down part of Abood on a more expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine).
147. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 628–29.
150. Id. at 629–30.
151. Id. at 632.
152. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
153. Id. at 244.
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providing such a platform,154 and that the government could not force
individuals to provide a platform for a particular message.155
The last category of compelled speech, known as compelled subsidy,
concerns government actions that force individuals to subsidize or partake
in speech with which they disagree. It has seen recent expansion. In a 2018
employment law case, the Supreme Court held that public-sector
employers may not require non-member employees of a union to pay
“agency fees,” which are a portion of union dues that cover only germane
activities, unrelated to the union’s political or ideological projects.156 The
Court found that the state’s agency fees violated the First Amendment as
it subsidized the speech of other, private speakers—even when it funded
activity with no specified political or ideological message.157
The Supreme Court has also struck down laws that require
dissemination of a speaker’s identity, which falls under the first category
of compelled speech concerning mandated expression of particular
content. For instance, the Court has invalidated a law that required
identification of the distributor of any handbill158 as well as a law that
prohibited circulation of anonymous leaflets in relation to political
campaigns.159 In both of these cases, the government could not force
individuals to disclose personal and sensitive information. In contrast, the
Court in Doe v. Reed160 refused to invalidate a Washington State statute
that required disclosure of the names and addresses of individuals who
signed referendum ballot petitions, in part because of the State’s
legitimate interest in preserving electoral integrity.161 The Court did,
however, hint that a narrower holding may be necessary in a case where a
plaintiff can show “a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure
[of personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment,
or reprisals.”162
The Trump Administration’s new gender policy implicates the First
Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine because the federal government
assigns an expression of speech to each individual—their gender—which
154. Id. at 254, 258.
155. Id. at 258.
156. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2455–56, 2460–61 (2018).
157. Id. at 2464, 2478.
158. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (finding the ordinance “void on its face”).
159. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
160. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
161. Id.
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010).
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the individual must then disseminate every time they show identification.
In many cases, this dissemination requires additional compelled speech to
explain the discrepancy between their lived gender and marked gender,
which frequently places transsex people in danger of harassment or
discrimination.163 This scenario inevitably arises under the Trump
Administration’s proposal, and it constitutes governmentcompelled speech.
IV. GENDER AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Gender protects fundamental rights enshrined by the Due Process
Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution. To begin, the Due Process Clause protects individuals from
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”164 It
has been interpreted to have both procedural and substantive
components.165 This Comment will overview its substantive component,
which protects certain fundamental rights. In addition, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 provides that “Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.”166 Privileges and immunities are interpreted as rights
granted by federal citizenship—sometimes stemming from natural law,
state and federal law, or the Bill of Rights.167 This Part will demonstrate
that gender designations influence the exercise of substantive due process
rights and privileges and immunities. Thus, accurate gender designations
are pivotal to protecting the liberty interests of transsex people.
A.

Substantive Due Process Rights

Since 1937,168 the Supreme Court has discerned two primary categories
of substantive due process rights: those that are enumerated against state
163. See infra section IV.B.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
165. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38, 47 (2013); RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2004).
166. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
167. Thomas H. Burrell, A Story of Privileges and Immunities: From Medieval Concept to the
Colonies and United States Constitution, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7, 8 (2011); Note, Congress’s Power
to Define the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1206, 1206–07 (2015);;
see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 74–75 (1997); Akhil R. Amar, Substance and Method in the Year
2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631 (2001).
168. In 1937, the United States Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). This case ended the infamous Lochner era, in which the Court regularly struck down
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and federal governments through the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment, and those that are unenumerated fundamental rights implicit
in due process liberty.169 The latter category is frequently implicated by
gender. For example, as previously illustrated, a transsex person’s ability
to exercise their right to marry was historically dependent on legal
determination of gender.170 This section will continue this discussion by
examining disparities in the realm of parentage, demonstrating that legal
gender has an enduring role in the exercise of substantive due
process rights.
An individual’s gender designation may impinge on the liberty interest
of parents “in the care, custody, and control of their children.”171 Since
Meyer v. Nebraska,172 the right to have children has been considered
fundamental and protected by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause.173 States still differentiate parentage rights on the basis of
gender—for example, in issuing the names and respective rights of
“mothers” and “fathers”—and therefore a proper gender designation is
critical.174 Since states continue to differentiate parental rights based on
gender, a transsex person’s gender designation may impinge on the liberty
interest of parents in bringing up children.
Gender is significant in the common law presumption of parenthood.175
Most states continue to presume that the “biological” father of a child is
the husband of a woman who gives birth.176 In terms of the presumption
of parenthood, “the law is not settled . . . [on] circumstances under which
the presumption can be resettled.”177 While the presumption of legitimacy
social and economic legislation on the grounds that such laws interfered with liberty of contract. See,
e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that federal legislation that
established a minimum wage for women and children was unconstitutional); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state legislation that limited weekly working hours for bakers was
unconstitutional). This set forth a new era of due process jurisprudence, in which rights must be
“sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to trigger elevated judicial scrutiny.” See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra
note 165, at 48–50.
169. SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 165, at 51.
170. See supra Part I.
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
172. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
173. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
174. Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465,
478 (2016).
175. Id.
176. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., PROTECTING THE
RIGHTS
OF
TRANSGENDER
PARENTS
AND
THEIR
CHILDREN:
A
GUIDE
FOR PARENTS AND LAWYERS 17 (2013), [hereinafter Rights of Transgender Parents] https://www.
aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-tg_parenting_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTP2-HZMK].
177. Id. at 18.

17 McConnell.docx (Do Not Delete)

482

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/28/20 7:22 PM

[Vol. 95:459

for married individuals “is one of the most firmly-established and
persuasive precepts known in law,”178 it fails to properly entitle transsex
individuals to parentage rights. The marital presumption, generally,
dictates that a man married to a woman who gives birth is the presumptive
biological father.179 The United States Supreme Court has recently casted
doubt on this traditional structure, holding that same-sex couples need to
be granted the same benefits of marriage—including the parental
presumption—as opposite-sex couples.180 However, states continue to
differentiate between “biological” parents and other parents in some
respects.181 For instance, several states continue to delineate that “the
marital presumption serves as a proxy for biological parenthood.”182
When an individual’s gender marker is accurate, they are entitled to the
same presumption as a cissex individual of their gender.183 Therefore, an
accurate gender designation is important to parents seeking to utilize the
marital presumption.
However, it should be noted that an accurate gender marker does not
assure that a transsex person will obtain and retain parental rights. The
rights of a transsex person to parenthood are often, and unfortunately,
implicated when that individual is discovered to be transsex, and the state
subsequently revokes parental rights based, at least in part, on gender
identity.184 Even transsex parents of biological children are at risk of
having their parental rights challenged if “they used assisted
reproduction.”185 In these cases, individuals are best able to conceal their
transsex status when their gender marker matches their external
presentation of gender.
Courts have discriminated against transsex parents solely because they
are transsex. In In re Marriage of Simmons,186 for instance, a transsex
man’s marriage to a woman was invalidated, and his parental rights
reversed, even though his birth certificate accurately listed his male

178. Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d 102, 103 (2003).
179. Jacobs, supra note 174, at 478; Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and IntentBased Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 317 (1990).
180. Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
181. For an overview on how the law continues to differentiate between “biological” and social
parents, often to the disability of LGBTQ parents, see Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood,
126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264–65, 2323–26 (2017).
182. Id. at 2295–96.
183. It should be noted that gay couples are also left out of the marital presumption in these states.
Id. Therefore, gay transsex people would not benefit from an accurate gender designation.
184. See infra Part I.
185. Rights of Transgender Parents, supra note 176, at 18.
186. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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gender.187 The same occurred in Kantaras v. Kantaras,188 where a Florida
court found that a “postoperative female-to-male transsexual person
[could not] validly marry a female.”189 In the latter case, the court withheld
opinion of the legal status of the children for a trial court to examine
on remand.190
Judicial knowledge of an individual’s transness, as revealed by a
conflicting, incorrect gender marker, implicates the right to care, custody,
and control of children. In J.L.S. v. D.K.S.,191 two parents—a cissex and
transsex woman—appealed from a decree of dissolution of their marriage.
The cissex mother alleged that the transsex mother had “adopted a
lifestyle such that it would be extremely harmful to [their] minor
children,” and to preserve the best interests of the minor children, only the
cissex mother should have visitation and custody.192 While the trial court
issued visitation and temporary custody to the transsex mother, the Court
of Appeals of Missouri reversed and awarded sole custody to the cissex
mother, finding that “the overwhelming evidence indicates that the parties
now do not share any commonality of beliefs regarding the raising of the
minor children.”193 The court found that the transsex mother’s gender
identity, among other things, was evidence that the parents did not have a
“commonality of beliefs concerning parental decisions.”194
Such decisions are not a relic of antiquity.195 In 2007, a Washington
Court of Appeals determined that a transsex parent should not have
primary custody over a child because the “impact of [the parent’s] gender
reassignment surgery on the children is unknown.”196 In the most extreme
187. Id. at 307.
188. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004).
189. Id. at 155.
190. Id. at 161.
191. 943 S.W.2d 766 (Miss. Ct. Ap. 1997). But see Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 132–33
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a transsex man’s transition was not “sufficient evidence” to find
that a custody transfer was in the best interests of the children); In re Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D.,
862 P.2d 368, 375 (Mont. 1993) (reversing a trial court’s determination that a transsex mother’s
transness would be irreparably harmful to her son, holding that the conclusion was unsupported by
evidence).
192. J.L.S., 943 S.W.2d at 770.
193. Id. at 774.
194. Id. at 774–45.
195. Helen Y. Chang, My Father is a Woman, Oh No!: The Failure of the Courts to Uphold
Individual Substantive Due Process Rights for Transgender Parents Under the Guise of the Best
Interest of the Child, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 649, 651 (2003).
196. Magnuson v. Magnuson, 141 Wash. App. 347, 350, 170 P.3d 65, 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007);
see also Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982) (“[T]he
transsexualism of the [parent] would have a sociopathic affect [sic] on the child . . . without
appropriate intervention.”).
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cases, courts have completely severed the parent-child relationship
because the parent was transsex. For instance, a Kentucky Court of
Appeals in 2007 terminated the parent-child relationship of one transsex
mother because of her gender identity and its purported effect on the
child.197 According to a 2011 national survey, 13% of parent respondents
reported that “courts limited or stopped relationships with children due to
their transgender identity or gender non-conformity.”198
Another unfortunate reality for transsex parents rearing children is that
courts have not hesitated to compel individuals to adhere to gender
stereotypes, often in express conflict with their gender.199 For example,
child custody orders may require transsex parents to perform or express
gender in a certain way to maintain parental rights.200 Specifically, a
transsex parent may be required conceal their gender identity from their
child whenever the court determines it is “necessary to protect the child
from harm.”201 Such orders stem from transphobic and unfounded notions
about the inherent harm a parent’s transition can have on children.202
Court orders that demand expression of a specific gender directly impact
a transsex person’s ability to raise their children, and they also likely
implicate the First Amendment, as gender expression is a form of
personal speech.203
B.

Privileges and Immunities

Gender also implicates liberties protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. An inaccurate gender designation restricts an

197. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 35, 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
198. JAMIE M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET & JUSTIN TANIS, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 88 (2011), https://www.transequalit
y.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT3Y-ZC45] (“Courts
limited or stopped relationships with children for 13% of respondents, with Black, Asian, and
multiracial respondents experiencing higher rates of court interference.” (emphasis omitted)); Beth
A. Haines et al., Making Trans Parents Visible: Intersectionality of Trans and Parenting Identities,
24 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 238, 239 (2014).
OF THE

199. See infra notes 200, 201.
200. Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State Interests in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender
Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 217 (2013).
201. Rights of Transgender Parents, supra note 176, at 7, 16. Courts have considered the
concealment of transsex identity to be a relevant factor in determining parental rights. See P.L.W. v.
T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that transsex parent did not present at their
actual gender in front of the child); In re the Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 862 P.2d 368 (Mont.
1993) (same).
202. See Jayke Pyne, Greta Bauer & Kaitlin Bradley, Transphobia and Other Stressors Impacting
Trans Parents, 11 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 107, 108 (2015).
203. See infra section V.B.
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individual’s liberty interest to pursue an occupation or common calling.
This is what the Lochner-era Supreme Court infamously referred to as
“the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation.”204
Originally thought to be protected by the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause, the right to pursue a common calling is now
interpreted under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.205 The Trump
Administration’s policy threatens transsex people’s right to earn a
livelihood in that it exposes transsex individuals to employment
discrimination, and potentially, procedural disqualification from
employment for having a mismatched gender designation.206
Transsex people are frequently subjected to employment
discrimination, and, in some circuits, receive no protection from
termination based on their gender identity.207 When an employee is forced
204. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
205. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 227 (2013); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978).
See also generally Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012).
206. One crucial and cautionary point on the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be noted.
The United States Supreme Court has never incorporated the clause against the federal government.
The Court has repeatedly struck down state laws that discriminate against rights and liberties
recognized under the clause. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (holding that an
Alaskan statute that required in-state oil and gas companies to give state residents a hiring preference
to be unconstitutional); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding that a South Carolina statute
that required a non-resident to pay one-hundred times as much as a resident for a shrimping license
was unconstitutional). The Fourteenth Amendment clearly incorporates the Privileges and Immunities
Clause against state governments, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; however, Article IV, section 2 has not
been interpreted to restrict federal power. See, e.g., Pollack v. Duff, 793 F.3d 34, 44 (2015) (“[W]e
think the weight of the evidence indicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not originally
understood as a limitation upon the authority of the federal government.”); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d
415, 430 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause [of Article IV] protects
citizens of one state from abuses by other states, and does not address powers, such as the granting of
citizenship, of the federal government.”); Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1030 n.7 (5th Cir.1991)
(“While we have held that state legislation may violate the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV if it unjustifiably denies the right to travel, that clause applies only to state legislation and does not
govern federal statutes.”); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Privileges
and Immunities Clause [of Article IV] has been construed as a limitation on the powers of the States,
not on the powers of the federal government.”); Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d
140, 145 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Article IV, § 2 is a limitation on powers of states and in no way affects the
powers of a federal district court.”). Because of the lack of incorporation, the impacts of gender on
privileges and immunities appears less compelling than its impacts on substantive due process rights.
This Comment nonetheless highlights them because they are fundamental rights enshrined in the
United States Constitution, to which every individual has an interest in exercising.
207. However, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue of whether
transsex people are protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which will determine
whether transsex people may have their employment terminated on account of gender identity; and,
potentially, whether cissex people must to conform to gender stereotypes to retain employment. R.G.
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Mem.) (Apr. 22, 2019).
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to disclose their identity due to a mismatched document, they are placing
themselves at both physical and economic risk. The numbers are alarming.
More than three-fourths of transgender people have reported some form
of workplace discrimination, and “one in four transgender people have
lost a job due to bias.”208 The misidentification of a transsex person’s
gender can also create a “stigma” or “disability” that forecloses
employment opportunities whenever a transsex person has to “out”
themselves.209 Forced outing may stigmatize an individual and “seriously
damage [their] standing and associations in [their] community.”210 This is
particularly alarming, as the larger transgender community already has an
unemployment rate of up to 70%.211
In addition, if an individual’s identification card (“ID”) does not
accurately reflect their gender, they may face difficulty obtaining or
maintaining employment.212 A legitimate ID is necessary for most legal
employment in the United States.213 Some states require that an
individual’s federal gender marker match state records before issuance of
a state ID.214 In this situation, if a transsex man is seeking an ID from the
state, his state gender marker must match the one listed on his federal
documents.215 The federal government has utilized a similar tactic that can
preclude employment. For example, the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) used a technique called “gender matching” for public sector
employees until 2011, which required that a person’s gender designation
in the Social Security database match that indicated on a work
application.216 The SSA recently resumed issuing “no-match” letters in
2019 for employee’s names and Social Security numbers, and notices may
be triggered by “typographical errors, unreported name changes, and

208. Employment, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/
issues/employment [https://perma.cc/PJ9W-686P].
209. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
210. Id.
211. Spade, supra note 75, at 751–52.
212. Id.
213. See I-9, Employment Verification, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
https://www.uscis.gov/i-9 [https://perma.cc/VAS3-TJUU].

&

IMMIGR.

SERVS.,

214. Spade, supra note 75, at 737–38.
215. See id.
216. Know Your Rights – Social Security, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
https://transequality.org/know-your-rights/social-security [https://perma.cc/WH7H-YMVS] (“What
About ‘No-Match Letters’? Will My SSA Record Out Me on the Job or Elsewhere?”); Waymon
Hudson, Social Security Ends “Gender No-Match” Letters for Employees, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
21, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/social-security-ends-gender-no-match_b_966654
[https://perma.cc/3H28-K64J].
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inaccurate or incomplete employer records.”217 Like occupational and
professional licenses, federal benefits, and drivers’ licenses, inaccurate
gender designations impinge on a transsex person’s ability to earn a living,
which is a particularly sensitive liberty interest.218 Gender designations
thus have a profound impact on many aspects of a transsex person’s life.219
Overall, the effectuation of substantive due process rights and
privileges and immunities are influenced by gender designations, and
sometimes, transsex status itself. In the realm of parentage and
employment, gender markers remain regrettably relevant. The impact of
gender may go largely unseen by cissex individuals, because a proper
gender designation offers them effortless access to facilities and
accommodations.220 However, the impacts are significant enough to
inhibit, or preclude entirely, exercise of fundamental rights. In such
scenarios, transsex people with accurate gender designations are better
able to conceal their transsex status and protect their liberty interests. As
the next Part will show, legal gender not only tangentially impacts
fundamental rights, but is a right in and of itself.
V.

THE LIBERTY IMPACT OF GENDER

This Part contends that gender is a property right and protected form of
speech. Section A first illustrates how gender exhibits characteristics of
both traditional property and “new property,” finding that transsex
individuals have a property interest in retaining accurate gender
217.
Employer Correction Request Notices (EDCOR), SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/employe
r/notices.html
[https://perma.cc/798P-RD66];
Laura
D.
Francis,
Social Security NoMatch Letters Causing Concern (Corrected), DAILY LABOR REPORT (May 7, 2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/social-security-no-match-letters-worryimmigrants-bosses [https://perma.cc/A3FJ-8YG3].
218. Reich, supra note 26, at 740–42.
219. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate
Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of
Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 398 (2013); Spade, supra note 75, at 775; supra
Part IV.
220. This claim should be caveated by the fact that some cissex and non-intersex people face similar
hurdles and occasionally violence for not adhering to heteronormativity or cisnormativity. See, e.g.,
Reginald Hardwick, Man Follows Woman Into Restroom Over ‘Perceived’ Gender, NBCDFW (May
1, 2016, 10:21 PM), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Man-Follows-Woman-Into-RestroomOver-Perceived-Gender-377761441.html [https://perma.cc/PP57-VVCY]; Matt DeRienzo, Woman
Mistaken for Transgender Harassed in Walmart Bathroom, NEWS TIMES (May 16, 2016, 3:50 PM)
[https://perma.cc/UDG3-VUKV]; Mitch Kellaway, Woman Sues Restaurant that Ejected Her from
Bathroom for Looking ‘Like a Man,’ ADVOCATE (June 17, 2015, 7:26 AM),
https://www.advocate.com/business/2015/06/17/detroit-woman-kicked-out-restaurant-bathroomlooking-man-sues [https://perma.cc/R8D8-4MR8].
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designations. Section B then establishes that inaccurate gender
designations are independently unconstitutional under the compelled
speech doctrine of the First Amendment. The way that gender manifests
itself through property and speech rights indicates that people have a
constitutional interest in maintaining an accurate gender designation.
Therefore, the Trump Administration’s policy impermissibly deprives
transsex individuals of their right to an accurate gender designation.
A.

Gender as Property

Gender constitutes a property right, under traditional conceptions of
property and government-created privileges known as “new property.”
Depending on the school of thought, gender may encompass all or some
of traditional property’s characteristics. Property rights have been
described as a “bundle of sticks,” which typically includes the right to
exclude,221 and the capability of possession, use, and transfer.222 This
section will overview common conceptions of property and illustrate how
institutions perpetuate and protect the legal identity of gender.
First, gender markers contain a core aspect of property: the ability to
exclude. Maleness and femaleness are distinct categories, constructed as
a legal identity by state governments,223 to which members of each
category exclude one another. Typically, only men may have a “male”
designation, and only women have a “female” designation. Therefore, for
a gender designation to have any value, it must exclude others—
specifically, people of other genders, or perhaps those that do not conform
to heteronormativity.224 This allows the designation of “male” or “female”
to have tangible use in society.
Gender also occupies the property trait of possession. Individuals may
“possess” their gender by adhering to heteronormative225 conceptions of
that gender.226 This possession includes the right to use and enjoyment, as
gender “is something that can both be experienced and deployed as a
resource.”227 For example, adhering to traditional markers of the male
gender allows someone to—at least briefly—possess maleness and reap

221. On the right to exclude, see generally Merrill, supra note 105.
222. On possession, use, and transfer, see Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a
Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 879–881 (2013).
223. See supra Part I.
224. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 151 (noting that “the law endows the holders of heteronormative
identities with all the rights in the ‘bundle of sticks’”).
225. See supra note 27.
226. Wigginton, supra note 24Error! Bookmark not defined., at 145.
227. Harris, supra note 25, at 1734.
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reward from the gender’s presentation. Although the federal government
may not enforce gender stereotypes upon people,228 the value of gender
markers comes from people’s ability to adequately possess the gender
designation—that is, to “pass”229 as the gender they are designated. For a
gender marker “to have any value, its holder’s appearance must match that
marker.”230 Therefore, when an individual passes as their gender, they are
taking advantage of the privileges associated with maleness and
femaleness.231
Lastly, gender may be transferred. The most obvious example of
transfer is from the genetic parent-child link.232 Genetic sex is ultimately
inherited from genetic parents233 and neurological sex is theorized to be
influenced by genetic factors.234 Some studies indicate that gender identity
is also influenced by hormones, which similarly derive from parents—
meaning that an individual’s gender is ultimately transferred through
biological factors from parent to child.235 The law facilitates this transfer
by requiring medical practitioners to designate a gender marker “as soon
as possible” after a child’s birth.236 Beyond genetic factors, gender may
also be transferred by the imposition and social conditioning of gender

228. See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of
Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297 (2012) (delineating the causes of action under federal statutes for
unconstitutional gender stereotyping); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 91 (2010) (explaining the
constitutional jurisprudence prohibiting gender stereotyping that emerged in the 1970s).
229. “Passing” generally refers to “a transgender person’s ability to be correctly perceived as the
gender they identify as.” Jae A. Lee, What Does “Passing” Mean in Terms of Transgender People?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-does-passing-meanwithin-the-transgender-community_us_593b85e9e4b014ae8c69e099 [https://perma.cc/5WCF67N3]. However, cissex people may also not “pass” if they do not conform to heteronormative
conceptions of gender. As a result, both transsex and cissex people find value in sufficiently
“possessing” their genders. See, e.g., supra note 220.
230. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 150.
231. Harris, supra note 19, under “right to use and enjoyment.”
232. Cf. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 148.
233. Id.
234. Arthur P. Arnold, Sex Chromosomes and Brain Gender, 5 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE
701 (2004) (arguing that “[g]enes on the sex chromosomes probably determine the gender (sexually
dimorphic phenotype) of the brain in two ways: by acting on the gonads to induce sex differences in
levels of gonadal secretions that have sex-specific effects on the brain, and by acting in the brain itself
to differentiate XX and XY brain cells”).
235. Stuart Tobet et al., Brain Sex Differences and Hormone Influences: A Moving Experience?,
21 J. NEUROENDROCRINOLOGY 1 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2669491/
pdf/nihms-99144.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5TE-A23A] (“Both genetic and hormonal factors likely
contribute to physiological mechanisms in development to generate the ontogeny of sexual
dimorphisms in brain.”).
236. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 150.
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stereotypes. For instance, “most children will be born to heterosexual [and
cissex] parents, many of whom will maintain roles consistent with the
dimensions of maleness or femaleness.”237 This is a transfer of gender’s
most utilized mechanisms of possession and use: stereotyping. Studies
have suggested that children who conform to gender stereotypes are less
likely than their non-stereotypic peers to face physical, verbal, and peerreported aggression,238 as well as social exclusion.239 Conformity with
gender stereotypes thus provides an individual with the best tools to utilize
gender’s property interests in society. As a result, gender has traditional
characteristics of property, because individuals may exclude others from
their gender designation and possess, use, and transfer gender.
Gender designations are also exceptionally similar in character and
function to “new property.” This is evident by how an accurate gender
designation impacts the exercise of substantive due process rights and
privileges and immunities.240 Individuals may use their gender
designation to exercise certain rights and benefits; indeed, gender
designations were historically used to prevent transsex people from
exercising their substantive due process rights.241 Although some
examples are now archaic, such as the right to marry,242 gender still has
an important influence on fundamental rights.243 For example, there is a
close link between gender’s use and its stereotyping mechanisms.
Individuals who possess femaleness may use femaleness to “gain custody
of children via courts’ presumption of maternal custody.”244 The use of
gender in this scenario implicates the fundamental right to rear children.
In contrast, maleness has traditionally been used to acquire higher
wages245 and positions of power.246
The Trump memorandum serves as an example of the federal
government characterizing social essentials—such as having a gender
marker congruent with one’s identity and lived experience—as a mere
“privilege” to be granted or rescinded by the government. In reality,

237. Id. at 149.
238. Laura Aspenlieder et al., Gender Nonconformity and Peer Victimization in Pre- and Early
Adolescence, 3 EURO. J. DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 3, 3–16 (2009).
239. Melanie Killen & Charles Stangor, Children’s Social Reasoning About Inclusion and
Exclusion in Gender and Race Peer Group Contexts, 72 CHILD DEV. 174, 174–86 (2001).
240. See supra Part IV.
241. See supra Part IV.
242. See supra note 32 (concerning the right to marry after Obergefell).
243. See supra Part IV.
244. Wigginton, supra note 24, at 147.
245. Id. at 146.
246. Every president of the United States has been male; additionally, approximately 81% of
congressional members are male. Id.
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gender designations have taken on a form of usable property, embedded
and legitimized by law. Whether it is conceived under the traditional
property model, or the more encompassing government-created form of
wealth, gender is property. Because of these property interests, transsex
people have a vested interest in maintaining an accurate
gender designation.
B.

Gender as Speech

In addition to the property interests inherent to gender, gender
designations act as an expression of gender identity, which is itself a form
of speech. The Trump Administration’s proposal would rubberstamp a
gender on every individual, based on initial gender assignment at birth.
For transsex people, the marker would directly conflict with their lived
experience and personal identification. Both the presentation of an
incorrect gender marker, and the disclosure that a marker is “amended,”
are examples of compelled speech that is impermissible under the First
Amendment. Incorrect gender markers force transsex individuals to
disclose that they are a different gender than indicated and force
individuals to “out” themselves as transsex to explain the discrepancy. For
instance, transsex people may be accused of identity theft for presenting
an obviously conflicting identification document.247 Both disclosure of
their actual gender and transsex status deprives transsex individuals of
their right to “decide for [themselves] the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence.”248
When individuals present identification documents with gender
markers, it is to answer the fundamental question: “Who are you?”249
Under the Trump Administration’s policy, transsex individuals are forced
to propagate a message that they fundamentally disagree with: that their
gender is what the federal government indicates, rather than what their
neurological biology or lived experience dictates it is. The First
Amendment forbids federal and state governments from “telling people
what they must say”250—especially with regards to speech that touches
247. See, e.g., Cat Reid, Lawsuit Challenges Kansas Birth Certificate Policy for Transgender
People, KSHB (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/lawsuit-challenges-kansasbirth-certificate-policy [https://perma.cc/38NT-TY43] (explaining that one of the plaintiffs
challenging Kansas’ birth certificate policy, which does not permit gender marker alterations, has
been accused of identity theft for presenting an identification document with an inaccurate gender).
248. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
249. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, F.V. v. Barron,
286 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (D. Idaho 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-00170-CWD), 2017 WL 10398823, at *11.
250. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 U.S. at 213.
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the heart as closely as gender identity. The policy would use citizens as a
“mouthpiece[ ] for official orthodoxy,”251 in that it would force
individuals to express a gender that is at odds with personal identity,
experience, and frequently, science.252 Consequently, forced expression
of gender through an inaccurate gender designation impinges on the
First Amendment.
Importantly, the damages that stem from compelled speech of gender
cannot be mitigated. A transsex person can typically disclaim an
inaccurate gender marker, such as by disclosing that they are transsex.
However, transsex people face physical, verbal, and sexual harassment
and discrimination in housing and employment based on their transsex
status.253 Forced disclosure of an individual’s transsex status places them
in unnecessary danger of discrimination and harassment.254 For example,
the 2015 United States Transgender Survey indicates that 46% of
transgender participants were verbally harassed in the last year, and onein-ten individuals were physically attacked, based on their gender
identity.255 These devasting numbers are in addition to the discriminatory
risk transsex people face in employment and housing.256
A transsex person’s ability to mitigate damages from compelled speech
would therefore rely on placing themselves in the more difficult situation
of having to “out” themselves and face subsequent stigma, harassment,
and discrimination. Even absent transphobia and the social impact of
being “outed” as a transsex person, an individual’s transsex status is
deeply personal and private information that deserves First Amendment
protection in its own right. As the Second Circuit stated: “The
excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons
who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate.”257
An individual’s transsex status is speech that an individual has a right to
keep private against coerced disclosure. Under the Trump
Administration’s redefinition of gender, disclosure may be required in
251. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 435 (5th ed. 2013).
252. See supra notes 3, 234, 235.
253. See supra section IV.C.
254. See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is . . . obvious that an
individual who reveals that she is a transsexual ‘potentially exposes herself . . . to discrimination and
intolerance.’”).
255. JAMES, S. E. ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, NATIONAL CENTER
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 13 (2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTSFull-Report-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/R286-VVXG].
256. Id. at 152–55; 176–80 (“Nearly one-quarter (23%) of respondents experienced some form of
housing discrimination in the past year, such as being evicted from their home or denied a home or
apartment because of being transgender.”).
FOR

257. Powell, 175 F.3d at 111.
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almost all circumstances where an individual’s gender marker conflicts
with their gender presentation.
At a minimum, an individual’s transsex status is protected by the
prohibition against forced disclosure of a speaker’s identity. An
individual’s transsex status is part of their identity—their gender identity.
Like dissemination of speaker identity for the distributor of a handbill258
or political leaflets,259 the government cannot force individuals to disclose
sensitive and personal information. The harm is compounded when
considering the frequency that individuals must present identification
documents. A transsex person is likely further protected by Doe v. Reed’s
dicta on threats and harassment; this is because transsex people can likely
prove that compelled disclosure of their transness will “subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals.”260 Therefore, special consideration
should be given to transsex individuals, as a mismatched gender marker
would frequently force them to disclose their transness, and may even
place them in danger from a discriminatory world.
CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration’s policy raises concerns on the extent of
federal power to control, coerce, and categorize people based on gender,
absent individual consent or acquiescence. The federal government’s
proposed policy, which demands an assigned, binary gender for every
individual, will place tremendous burdens on transsex people and will
even occasionally place burdens on cissex people. The Trump
Administration’s redefinition undermines a transsex person’s property
and speech rights inherent to their gender designation, which in turn
implicate substantive due process rights and privileges and immunities.
Because of the fundamental rights threatened, the Trump
Administration’s redefinition of gender does not pass constitutional
muster. And beyond the rights both enumerated and unenumerated by the
United States Constitution, legal gender touches the heart of every
individual’s life. Depriving transsex people of an accurate gender
designation attempts to dissuade transsex people from engaging in public
life, and ultimately, existing in the world.

258. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (finding the ordinance “void on its face”).
259. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
260. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010).

